Last June, I was asked to write a paper about safety standards in humanitarian demining for a conference. That paper was also used as an article in the James Madison University demining magazine at the end of the year. It had the catchy title "Current situation and perceived needs for head and face protection in humanitarian demining" and was mostly concerned with blast visors. This is being written as an article - so has a less formal title and covers a wider subject matter in less depth. I hope it will also be a little easier to read and may provoke a wider response.
This article deals with some common misconceptions about deminers, demining and demining equipment. It is not an academic paper - but a discussion prompt. Some of the points are old enough to appear bearded to the field men: sorry about that but newcomers still need to hear them. A few are contentious. To some extent I am playing devil's advocate, although all of the points raised in this article have arisen during my field work. I believe they deserve an airing, and would be very interested to hear well reasoned contrary opinions - or words of support. My private email is avs@new-med.co.uk
Throughout this article I quote common misconceptions in bold italics. In some cases I may not have used quite the right wording, but I think I have caught the intent. Those who know me may recognise some arguments, but their presence here does not mean that I subscribe fully to them. It does mean that I think they have validity, but I would be the first to admit that there is no single right answer.
1. Least helpful misconceptions
There are several myths about demining that tend to irritate me much more than they should. My least favourite is the line favoured by politicians:
"If we can send men to the moon, we must be able to do better than a man with a prod!"
Of course, it looks as though it would be easy to improve on the prod, but how do you improve on the person? Anyone who has been engaged in manual demining knows that the deminer gathers data constantly, from eyes, hands, and even through the soles of his boots. That information is processed almost instantly, and balanced judgments result. The human eye is actually the most effective detector. It recognises subtle clues faster than any machine, and is responsible for locating more devices than any other tool.
The "man with a prod" is presented as an unsophisticated cave-man technology. It is in fact more sophisticated than any artificial device yet available. No matter how many millions are thrown at robotics, it will be a very long time before we equal the sophisticated array of data gathering and processing equipment that is a human being - never mind get it into a small, intelligent and autonomous robot.
And as far as prods are concerned - I discuss "improvements"
later.
The truth is that we have a long way to go before we can do better
than a man with a prod.
"More mines are being laid than cleared today."
Most of the mines in the ground around the world were more-or-less "donated" to support surrogates in cold war conflicts that were played out on foreign soil. Millions of mines were effectively dumped in ideological conflict regions. Their local use was often profligate - and their utility assumed to be proven (partly because of the examples of indiscriminate use set by the US and the Soviets in South East Asia and Afghanistan).
The truth is that since the end of the cold war the extensive use of anti-personnel mines appears to have declined rapidly.
Meanwhile the ICRC (who propagated the "more mines" myth) have failed to answer the thousands who have asked the crucial question, "Where are the two million new mines being laid each year?"
"Mines have no place in modern warfare".
This one is true to a point - from a Western point of view. If you fight your wars on foreign soil and have every kind of expensive technology at your disposal so that you can anticipate a rapid victory, the prospect of having to clear up your mines can make them more trouble than they are worth. If, however, you are fighting a protracted civil war, mines are useful - as any foot soldier knows. This is why the Vietcong made them out of wood and bamboo in their underground workshops, and why Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are common in Bosnia and Afghanistan. You can't ban IEDs, which are usually simple mines. The ICBL has shown that you can make commercially produced mines more hard to come by - which I think is good - but they don't have to pretend that this effort will solve the landmine problem. As a military friend pointed out recently, any country with the capacity to put beans in a can or make plastic toys can produce landmines in quantity when it wants to.
The truth is that as long as conflicts continue, victim initiated devices (mines) of one kind of another will be used.
"Mines are the greatest killer in post-conflict regions."
This is a gross oversimplification. In some areas it is true. In many areas it is the other detritus of war that claims most lives. And these incidents are not always "accidents". In countries with a ruined economy and huge numbers of displaced people trying to grub some kind of a living, a few pennies for scrap metal can seem very attractive. The greatest risk depends where you happen to be. For example, some people say it is booby traps that are the greatest killers in Bosnia, and while the distinction is pretty academic to the victim, it is critical to the men clearing the ground.
The truth is that, while it lacks the sound-bite ring, the armaments left around are the greatest killers in post conflict regions.
2. Know your deminer
"You can meet deminers and find out about demining at conferences."
Briefly, a deminer is not someone you will meet at a conference or someone who is paid a UN salary. Those people may be Demining Supervisors, but they do not actually clear mines themselves. I can think of only three ex-pats who regularly demine among the many hundreds I have met on my travels - and they do so out of an obsessive personal commitment, not because they are paid to do so. The ex-pat is far more economically occupied in training and management tasks (often 20 local deminers can be employed for the same daily salary, not to mention other costs).
This is not to say that ex-pats do not take risks - they often do when unusual circumstances occur, and occasionally do just by being in the unstable countries where they are working. They frequently have to put up with a level of management frustration that would drive lesser men to murder while juggling more balls than any circus act in conditions of considerable physical hardship. But, on the whole, they do not demine.
The truth is that in most cases, ex-pats are contractually prohibited from actual demining, and some have never looked for and found a mine in a real situation. Also, many of the speakers at conferences are self professed "experts". With notable exceptions, very few have much on the ground with a prod demining experience.
Ex-pat EOD men usually do get their hands on, but are specialist EOD people rather than deminers - and when EOD is taken seriously its equipment needs can be much more sophisticated. Of course, (apologies to Andy MacAndrew), there is a sense in which all demining is EOD, but it is simplest to continue to recognise a difference for the time being.)
I define a humanitarian Deminer as someone whose principal day-to-day activity is physically clearing an area believed to be mined (by eye, with dogs, detectors, prodders or other means). The man who makes sure he is trained, equipped and works according to the rules is not a "Deminer". By my definition, he is a "Demining Supervisor".
3. Deminers
"Demining is a specialist activity that it takes a long time to learn."
Most field deminers in developing countries are local men. They may have a military background but rarely one that involved much in-depth training. Some organisations have new deminers working in a live area within ten days of starting their training. They will then work alongside a more experienced person for up to six months of further "on-the-job" training (often on reduced pay).
Around the world, most demining organisations give no more than six weeks training before putting local deminers in a live situation. They argue that it is not economic to spend large sums on training when deminers may leave to work with another organisation at any time (poaching of experienced people is a problem wherever commercial demining is established). The fact that a trained deminer is usually only paid around US$5 a day is also relevant.
At first glance this level of training seems inadequate: certainly it is very different from what would be considered essential in Europe and the USA. But in this case the training is not for a career in sophisticated EOD work. It is for a deminer to be able to reliably (and safely) find devices (not just mines). Often he does not even have to set an explosive charge - the team leader will do that. How long does it take to learn how to use a particular detector, carefully clear undergrowth and prod the ground at the right angle? Five days, ten days? Even then, most of the time is spent on repetition so that what is deemed "good practice" becomes a habit - a habit that is then reinforced by supervision in a live area.
This works and, perhaps significantly, from the incomplete information about accidents I have gathered, it looks as if the highest risk time among deminers is not in their first weeks or even the first year of work. While many details in accident reports are "suspect", I cannot think of any reason why "length of service" should be one of those.
Before criticising the length and scope of training, remember to place it in the context where it is applied. In some countries, there are more deminers injured in road accidents than while working: in many the risk of early death from violence and sickness is very high. Often there is no realistic health care, no effective police force and an openly corrupt administration: no water supply, no telephone system and a currency so worthless that Mercedes owning government ministers keep their savings in $US while rural children die of common intestinal parasites. Is it appropriate to apply Western standards to deminer training when they are absent from any other aspect of local life?
The truth is that while demining is a specialist activity, it does not take long to learn.
(That said, I still want to see standards rise - and I have been involved in the local production of protective gear and handtools for that purpose. After all, the situation in the post conflict country is supposed to be improving and standards across the board should be rising.)
4. West is Best
"The rules of humanitarian demining must be set by Western specialists."
The observant witness in the field will find that published rules are widely ignored and the command structures are often evaded. The working position, use of tools, and even the thoroughness of searching the ground, will vary from site to site. Very little of it will map directly onto the published operating procedures and the glossy brochures that are available at home. In the field. the rules are seen as guidelines, and pragmatism takes over. No one should be surprised by this: it happens in many professions - not least the serving military.
In many places around the world, ex-pat staff have told me that the organisation they have established will collapse as soon as foreign expertise is withdrawn. I believe they are often right. Some of them think this is because of a local lack of sophistication and/or endemic corruption. Both problems are common, but the reason for unsustainability may well be that the Western command structure is simply inappropriate for the local culture. Do not assume that a command structure suited to local circumstances will be less strict or efficient. Some locally managed commercial companies involved in demining in Africa are very strict, and very cost effective. MineTech and Mechem are obvious examples. And while commercial companies may need to be closely watched to ensure that corners are not cut, we may still be able to learn something about appropriate command structures from them. I do not mean to suggest the widespread adoption of their methods - where discipline and punishment regimes may be brutal - merely their study to see what parts can usefully be adopted.
The truth is that Western specialists can usefully provide a starting point, but the actual rules applied will always vary.
"Western military training is the best preparation for organising humanitarian demining."
Soldiers may argue about which country's training is the best, but they tend to accept the above statement as a fact. Many accept that what they see in the field is not ideal, but it tends to be assumed that a Western style military regime will be the safest and most efficient way of organising humanitarian demining in the field. It is often seen as the only option available, anyway.
Humanitarian demining is not just about clearing areas of ground. The management and maintenance of a large ground clearance programme requires very different skills from those of the deminer, and the skills of the ex-pat staff involved reflects this.
At this point it can be useful to separate Demining Supervisors from Demining Managers. In general, the Supervisor spends time regularly in the field while the Manager may visit the field, but spends his working life in an office. In general, the higher the military rank, the more likely the ex-soldier is to be a Manager - and the more experience he will have of the management role.
Demining Supervisors usually have a lower military rank and more hands on experience. Most of those I have met have a maximum of eight weeks training on military mine clearance somewhere in their past, and many recognise that this is no preparation for the needs of humanitarian demining. To their credit, most learn as they go and some have become really good at recognising the needs of their men and at making incremental improvements to working practice and equipment.
In very few cases the Demining Supervisor's background includes training in how to train, never mind how to train an unsophisticated technician in a developing country. Yet that is usually the most important part of their job. In no case that I know of has the Supervisor's background included an in-depth analysis of development issues in the country and culture in which they are operating (although a few have acquired it).
Given the lack of preparation, it is quite astounding how much Demining Supervisors often achieve - and that is the main argument I can find in favour of using people with a military background: they may not have the appropriate skills when they arrive, but they tend not to accept failure as an option. Whether they are working against or with the management system when they achieve things is a moot point in some areas.
One of the most efficient demining NGOs I have met is not run my people with military training at all - and is one of the few run by people who also work as deminers as well as Supervisors. As their profile has grown they have been obliged to get some formal explosives training, and have taken on ex-pats with military training to meet funder requirements. But their training and staff extension was after the event, rather than in preparation for it.
While using ex-soldiers makes sense when rapid action is required in an emergency, it is not so obviously desirable when the problem is not one that can be solved with a single concerted intervention. To devise and implement a sustainable solution that will continue without foreign intervention requires skills that are not necessarily part of military training. In Cambodia and Afghanistan, the UN has recognised this and appointed people to head CMAC and MACA who can see the broader picture. These are both men with a military background who have put aside the blinkers of their training and accepted the necessary learning curve in the job. More power to them. Give them the power to appoint support staff with a development background (rather than a fancy degree) and their jobs might become much easier.
The truth is, it is by no means obvious that Western military training is an adequate, appropriate or sufficient preparation for organising humanitarian demining. Neither is it obvious that an MBA or a Doctorate (increasingly UN requirements) from a Western University would help in any way at all.
5. Demining equipment
"The equipment issued to our military guys is the best in the world."
From which it is sometimes argued that the same equipment should be used in demining. It rarely is. There are three main reasons why is isn't. The high cost of military equipment, the fact that it is not designed for use in humanitarian demining, and the Western world's fascination with technology for its own sake.
Equipment designed for a military purpose is made by an industry that often thinks cost is not a major issue, and always includes the cost of aggressive marketing. The end product can include features designed for covert combat situations, such as camouflage, infrared invisibility, ultra-light and ultra-small components, multi-function compatibility with other combat equipment, etc. Often designed for occasional use, it frequently cannot withstand the "normal" treatment sustained during humanitarian demining in the field. The Schiebel AN-19/2 mine detector is a fine example of this, with defunct units (that are uneconomic to repair) littering Africa.
An ideal design specification for humanitarian demining would not include the above features and would stress features that do not feature highly among military needs. The most important are low cost, robustness in extended use, simplicity of operation and easy service/repair in the field.
As far as metal detectors are concerned, the Ebinger 420 series comes closest to these requirements (without meeting them) and so is popular with "deminers" despite lacking the sensitivity of some competitors.
The example of detectors is the high-tech end of demining equipment. Probes (prodders) are probably the lowest tech item. The simplest probes I have seen in use have been lengths of reinforcing bar costing a dollar. The most expensive military probe I have encountered is offered at CAN$700, but the average seems to be around US$100. To justify the cost, most of them have added value designed in. The fanciest claim to be able to identify the material obstructing their progress through the ground, others contract into short handles, or extend into two meter long sticks. In some cases, these probes are designed with humanitarian demining in mind, but they are not designed with low cost, robustness in extended use, simplicity of operation and easy service/repair in the field in mind.
Frequently, the designers have also forgotten to carry out any analysis of what is wanted. They appear to move directly from a new hi-tech idea to a marketing strategy and rely on modern man's fascination with technology to supply the "need".
Take the DEW Smart-probe as an example (about CAN$700). According to the salesman I spoke to, this battery powered probe can discriminate between stone, wood and plastic - so you probe the ground until you hit something, then read off what you have hit. Assuming that it can cope with paint, bakelite or sticky soils, it sounds neat, until you think about why anyone would want a smart probe. The only economic/sensible reasons seem to be either to speed up the mine detection process or to make it safer.
In most cases the Smart-probe would be used to investigate a detector signal. Imagine this scenario. The detector signals and the deminer narrows the signal down as best he can, then lays aside the detector and picks up his DEW Smart-probe. On the first insertion the probe hits something and the reading is "stone". There could be a pebble in front of the mine, so the user must insert again. Again the reading is stone, but that does not prove there is not a mine just behind a second stone, so he inserts again, and again, and again. To be sure that he is not dealing with a mine the user would still have to probe all around the signal, breaking up the ground. To meet most clearance requirements in humanitarian demining, the user would then have to remove the soil and find the metal that made the detector signal. So, such a probe would not increase the speed of investigating a signal. I cannot see how it would make that investigation safer either, but can see how it might give false-confidence if it was misused. (Thanks to Bob Keeley.)
Quite apart from its high initial cost, its reliance on batteries (expensive and hard to get in remote areas) and its apparently short design life (how many insertions do they think it will make in a year?), the people behind the DEW smart-probe do not appear to have considered the needs of the market before developing this expensive toy.
The truth is that equipment designed for a military purpose is rarely ideal for use in humanitarian demining.
6. Do-it-yourself equipment
"Locally made is always low quality."
This is rarely stated as bluntly, but is often a clear assumption behind the attitude of equipment purchasers. It is an attitude that is fostered by suppliers of equipment in the West - who prefer everyone to source through them. The demining supply industry is a sophisticated, hard-sell extension of the arms supply business, so no one should expect it to have honesty as a major aim.
The main advantages of demining groups having their equipment supplied from local sources are:
The main disadvantages are:
With simple manufacturing regimes including quality assurance checks at all levels, all four of the disadvantages can be overcome by manufacturing in a stable neighbouring country - as long as the product is simple, or is an incremental improvement on what is already used. No design awards here, just common sense. Most field men can readily suggest improvements to existing tools, and many can explain what they want a new piece of equipment to do, even if they do not have the familiarity with a sketchpad to draw it.
The truth is that, perfectly adequate locally made simple tools exist (NPA Mozambique, HALO Cambodia, CMAC Cambodia, etc, etc). More sophisticated items such as blast visors and body armour can also be made regionally, as has been proven in my own work.
7. Billion dollar equipment
"We need to spend millions of dollars using our best brains and research facilities to develop new equipment for demining."
This assumption seems to rest on the belief that "Incremental changes are too small to count - we need a paradigm leap forward to solve this problem now". It also conceals the assumptions that the need could only be met by the "best" brains in Western R&D.
Since 1994, I have seen considerable changes to the equipment used on the ground. The changes are largely in two areas - deminer tooling/protection and Mechanical Assistance. These serve two purposes, enhanced safety and enhanced speed - and the division between purposes maps pretty well onto the division between equipment areas.
None of the recent changes are the direct result of any new expenditure on research and development in the West. Reasons for this failure of R&D effort range from confused design criteria (mixing military needs with those of humanitarian demining) to plain ignorance of the problems in the field. In many cases the inappropriateness of the design has been made obvious early in its development, but once the funds have been granted and the developers appointed, it seems that the work must go on regardless.
Commercial developers suffer the same confused design aims. To return to the example of detectors, a Schiebel salesman told me that there are not enough sales in humanitarian demining to warrant the development of a detector for that market, so their detectors continue to be designed primarily for the military. They know what is wanted (I, among others, have told them) but profit must come first.
Leaving aside the incremental improvement of demining tooling and protection (an area where my interest may make me less than objective) the development of Mechanically Assisted demining provides an object lesson for those believing that Western based R&D is essential. While huge sums are being spent of monstrously heavy and strong machines that many believe will never work adequately, some demining groups, such as NPA in Angola, have taken existing "mine clearance" vehicles (the Aardvark) and used them in a more realistic role as an area reduction and vegetation clearance tool without significantly revising the original machine. This is quick, but too expensive for most groups to consider. The HALO Trust, MineTech, and MACA (amongst others) have all taken existing plant equipment (much cheaper than military equipment) and adapted it for use in the field. Their converted back-hoes, tractors and road-graders speed up the process of clearance dramatically. These groups have made minimal adjustments (usually armouring) to existing equipment and got on with the job without applying much thought to further developments. MgM in Angola, who pioneered the use of mulchers and road-graders, have gone one stage further. With a pool of scrap mine-resistant vehicles to draw on (in Namibia), and obsessive personal commitment, they have made fundamental refinements and developed dedicated Mechanically Assisted Mine clearance (MAM) systems at remarkably low cost (mostly from their own pockets).
The success of all the existing MAM systems relies on them being developed in the field, where very expensive or impractical ideas are quickly dropped. Making incremental improvements to what they can get, and with an everyday pressure for speed and effectiveness, these groups have already made a real difference to demining speed (in most cases without compromising safety).
The truth is that, MAM systems have been developed in the field at a fraction of the costs being expended on developing unsuitable equipment in safe countries overseas. If some of that cost were dedicated to field refinement, it could be far more effective in terms of speeding up the clearance of ground.